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City of Edmonds v. Oxford House: 
Group Homes in the Family's Backyard*1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the "basic building block[s]" of communities throughout the 
United States are districts set aside by local zoning ordinances for resi-
dential use by single families. Single-family zones2 have been protected 
by the United States Supreme Court for over sixty-nine years.3 They ef-
fectively discriminate against the handicapped by excluding group homes 
for the handicapped that require a large number of unrelated individuals 
to effectively operate.4 In 1988, Congress amended the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) making it illegal for local zoning codes to discriminate against the 
handicapped, while including an exemption for any ordinance regarding a 
maximum number of occupants. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House5 dis-
cusses the issue of whether traditional single-family zones' capping of 
the number of unrelated individuals who may live in a house falls within 
the exemption from the FHA. The Supreme Court held that the FHA only 
exempts single-family zones from imposing a cap on all occupants. The 
consequences of this decision require that communities either litigate the 
question of whether single-family zones effectively excluding group 
homes discriminates against the handicapped, modify the single-family 
zone to fall within the FHA exemption, or accept group homes in single-
family zones-a politically unacceptable notion. 
This Note examines the holding of the Court, analyzes its reasoning 
and postulates the various alternatives communities are faced with as a 
result of the ruling. Part II describes the FHA, noting the conflict in inter-
* Copyright © 1997 by Paul Holmes Masters 
I. Thanks to Professor Dale A. Whitman for his helpful comments and contributions to 
this article. 
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, City of Edmonds v. Washington State Building 
Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir 1994) (No. 94-23). See also Douglas E. Miller, Note, The 
Fair Housing Act, Oxford House, and the Limits of Local Control over the Regulation of Group 
Homes for Recovering Addicts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1467, 1470, 1488 (1995). 
3. Miller, supra note 2; Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926). Petition for Writ of Cert. at 8, Washington State, (No. 94-23). 
4. Group homes for the handicapped generally require a minimum of six individuals to 
"ensure financial self-sufficiency and to provide the mutual support necessary for recovery from 
alcohol and drug abuse." Brief for Respondents at 9, City of Edmonds v. Washington State 
Building Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-23). 
5. 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1780 (1995). 
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pretation of the exemption from the beginning. It also notes the conflict-
ing interpretations of the FHA exemption by the Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. Part III summarizes the facts of the case, and the majority and dis-
senting opinions. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dis-
senting opinions. Finally, Part V considers the alternatives available to 
communities and the likely consequences of each. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Congress, in 1988, amended the Fair Housing Act (FHA), to prohibit 
discrimination against the handicapped in housing. 6 The FHA as a-
mended defined "handicap" as including any person with a physical or 
mental impairment which limits either the person's "major life activities" 
or has a record of such an impairment. 7 Because courts interpreting the 
FHA have held that a recovering drug addict or alcoholic qualifies as a 
handicapped person, 8 a community cannot discriminate against such an 
6. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3260 
(1988)). Miller, supra note 2, at 1472. Another legislative change in the FHA included the 
"expansion of prohibited bases" to familial status. William L Browning, A Proactive Approach 
May Be a Bank's Best Fair Lending Strategy, 14 No.3 BANKING PoL'Y REP. 28, 38 (1995). 
7. The FHA defines "handicap" as: 
(I) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person's major life activities, 
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or 
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does not include current, 
illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in § I 02 of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C § 802)). 
42 U.S.C § 3602(h) (1988). See also Cindy L Soper, Note, The Fair Housing Amendments of 
1988: New Zoning Rules for Group Homes for the Handicapped, 37 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 1033, 1033-
35 (1993); Miller, supra note 2, at 1483-84; William Graham, Note, There Goes the 
Neighborhood: The Evolution of "FamiZy" in Local Zoning Ordinances, 9 TOURO L REV. 699, 
707-11 (1993). But see City of St. Joseph v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 859 S.W.2d 723, 
725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the plain meaning of physical or mental impairment 
"addresses . . physically or mentally handicapped persons ... but not persons suffering from 
alcohol or drug abuse ... since these terms address different populations"). 
8. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 921 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that individuals who are former drug users or addicts are handicapped if they are not 
currently using an illegal drug). The court also noted that the legislative history of the FHA 
Amendment reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183 clearly demonstrates that Congress 
intended to use the word "handicap" as defined in the Rehabilitation Act which states: 
(C)(l) For purposes of subchapter V of this chapter, the term "individual with a 
disability" does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of 
drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such use. (ii) nothing in clause (I) shall 
be construed to include as an individual with a disability who - (I) has successfully 
completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer 
engaging in such use, (II) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is 
no longer engaging in such usc, or (III) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, 
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individual so far as housing is concerned. In amending the FHA, Con-
gress also exempted "any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions 
regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a 
dwelling."9 Because group homes for recovering alcoholics and drug ad-
dicts often exceed the maximum number of occupants allowed under lo-
cal zoning ordinances, the question as to whether such local zoning ordi-
nances are under the exemption in the FHA regarding maximum occu-
pancy limits has been raised. 10 
When the Eleventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit individually ana-
lyzed this issue, their rulings conflicted. In Elliott v. City of Athens, Ga., 11 
the Eleventh Circuit held that traditional single family zones were exempt 
from the FHA in regard to maximum occupancy limit. 12 The court sup-
ported its reasoning in a similar analysis of zoning ordinances performed 
by the Third Circuit in Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 
1989). 13 Conversely, in City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code 
Council, the Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the conclusion of the 
Eleventh Circuit, holding that "Edmonds' single-family use restriction is 
not exempted." 14 The United States Supreme Court accordingly granted 
certiorari to resolve the direct conflict between the Ninth and the Elev-
enth Circuit decisions concerning the scope of this exemption in City of 
Edmonds v. Oxford House. 15 
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court held that only ordi-
nances which impose "total occupancy limits" are exempt from the 
FHA' s scope. 16 Because the limit imposed by the City of Edmonds (-
Edmonds) did not equate to an absolute maximum on occupancy, the 
Court denied Edmonds' motion for a summary judgment and the question 
to be decided by the lower court became whether Edmonds' actions were 
in violation of the "FHA's prohibitions against discrimination set out in 
but is not engaging in such use. 
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(1991 ). See also City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 
18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. 1776 
(holding "[p ]articipation in a supervised drug rehabilitation program, coupled with non-use, meets 
the definition of handicapped"); Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, 638 N.E. 2d 906 (Mass. 
1994) (holding the FHA protects "an addict who is participating in a supervised rehabilitation 
program and who is no longer using illegal drugs"). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1 ). 
10. Oxford houses typically require more than eight residents to be feasible. See Oxford 
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1578 (E.D. Mo. 1994). See also Soper, supra 
note 7, at 1037; Miller, supra note 2, at 1512-13. 
11. 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 376 (1992). 
12. !d. at 981. 
13. !d. at 980. 
14. Washington State, 18 F.3d at 807. 
15. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780. 
16. !d. at 1779. 
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sections 3604(f)(l)(A) and (f)(3)(B)." 17 As a result of this decision, the 
Edmonds Court has effectively required that communities throughout the 
United States accept group homes into single-family dwelling zones-a 
politically unacceptable option. 
Ill. CITY OF EDMONDS VS. OXFORD HOUSE 
A. The Facts 
In the summer of 1990, Oxford House leased a home in a neighbor-
hood zoned exclusively for single-family homes. Edmonds, like thou-
sands of communities nationwide, restricted use of houses within the 
single-family zone to one family, defined as "an individual or two or 
more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of 
five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or mar-
riage."18 Oxford House began to use the leased property as a group home, 
which housed "[ten] to [twelve] adults recovering from alcoholism and 
drug addiction."19 Edmonds issued citations charging the Oxford House 
with violation of the housing code.20 The "Oxford House asserted reli-
ance on the [FHA] which declares it unlawful 'to discriminate in the sale 
or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
buyer or renter because of a handicap of ... that buyer or a renter.' "21 
Edmonds sued Oxford House in district court, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that Edmonds' single-family zoning ordinance was exempt from the 
FHA's anti-discrimination requirement, while Oxford House counter-
claimed under the FHA.22 Both parties filed for summary judgment, and 
the District Court granted Edmonds' motion holding the ordinance ex-
empt from the FHA. On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the 
exemption inapplicable to Edmonds' single-family zoning ordinance. 23 
B. The Majority Opinion. 
First, the Court defined the sole issue before it: "whether Edmonds' 
family composition rule qualifies as a 'restrictio[n] regarding the maxi-
17. !d. at 1783. 
18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, City of Edmonds v. Washington State Building 
Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-23) (quoting Edmonds Community 
Development Code (ECDC) § 21.30.010 (1991)). 
19. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779. 
20. /d. 
21. /d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A)). 
22. /d. at 1779. 
23. /d. 
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mum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.' "24 If the or-
dinance did qualify, then the FHA exempted it and summary judgment 
was proper. 
Next, the Court recognized that its reading of the exemption should 
be constrained narrowly. Noting that precedent recognized the FHA's 
policy as "broad and inclusive,"25 the Court restricted its analysis of the 
exemption to a narrow reading in order "to preserve the primary opera-
tion of the [policy]. "26 
Once the Court determined to read the exemption narrowly, it fo-
cused on interpreting the exemption by recognizing two classes of restric-
tions on real property-land use restrictions and maximum occupancy 
restrictions.27 By distinguishing between these two types of restrictions, 
the Court found it could better focus on the proper interpretation of the 
exemption by referring to the type of restriction referred to in the statute. 
The Court noted that a land use restriction designates "'districts in 
which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are ex-
cluded.' "28 These types of restrictions "preserv[ e] the character of neigh-
borhoods"29 by defining the term "family" and by correspondingly re-
stricting the use of all real property within the zone to legally defined 
families. 30 In doing so, a neighborhood is able to create a zone "where 
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and 
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."31 
While a land use restriction attempts to create a haven from outside 
influences, a maximum occupancy restriction seeks to "protect the health 
and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding."32 Generally, such re-
strictions impose a cap on the "number of occupants per dwelling, typi-
cally in relation to available floor space or the number and type of 
rooms."33 
The Court then compared the statutory exemption to the two types of 
restrictions recognized and found that the FHA only exempted maximum 
occupancy restrictions. The Court noted that "'restrictions regarding the 
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling' surely 
24. Jd (quoting 42 U.S.C § 3607(b)(l)). 
25. Jd (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972)). 
26. /d. (quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). 
27. /d. at 1780. 
28. Edmonds, liS S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.16, 113-14 
(3d ed. 1993)). 
29. /d. at 1781. 
30. !d. 
31. !d. (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 9 (1974)). See also Miller, 
supra note 2, at 1472. 
32. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781. 
33. !d. 
146 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
encompasses maximum occupancy restrictions."34 But because land use 
restrictions attempt to "preserve the family character of a neighbor-
hood,"35 the Court was unable to reconcile such restrictions with an ex-
emption regarding the occupancy limits. The Court buttressed its inter-
pretation by referring to the legislative history noted in the House Com-
mittee Report which stated that "[ r ]easonable limitations by governments 
would be allowed to continue, as long as they were applied to all occu-
pants, and did not operate to discriminate on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, national origin, handicap or familial status."36 Therefore, the 
Court held that only ordinances which "cap the total number of occupants 
in order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling . . . fall within 
§ 3607(b)(l)'s absolute exemption from the FHA's govemance."37 
Because Edmonds' ordinance is a "classic exampl[ e] of a use restric-
tion and complementing family composition rule ... [which does] not 
cap the number of people who may live in a dwelling,"38 the Court held 
that the ordinance was "not exempt from the FHA under section 
3607(b)(1)."39 The Court used a simple test to determine whether an ordi-
nance was exempt from the FHA. For an ordinance to be exempt, one 
1nust be able to answer a simple question: "What is the maximum number 
of occupants permitted to occupy a house?"40 The Edmonds' ordinance 
imposes no maximum occupancy limit on a house occupied by people 
related "by genetics, adoption, or marriage."41 Such a household could 
comprise "[t]en siblings, their parents and grandparents."42 Since the 
question cannot be answered in such a case, the ordinance does not fall 
within the exemption granted in section 3607(b )(1 ). Only absolute occu-
pancy limits, not limits based on familial relationships, fall within the 
FHA exemption.43 
34. !d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l)). While such a conclusion would appear to be a 
quod erat demonstratum, it is referenced to emphasize the importance of the majority's 
differentiation between these two classes of zoning ordinances. As shown later in the dissent's 
opinion, the majority's opinion necessitates this differentiation in order to exclude Edmonds' 
ordinance from the class of "any restrictio[n] regarding a maximum occupancy limit" which the 
FHA exempts. See infra, notes 54-59,110-125. 
35. ld. at 1782. 
36. ld. at 1782 n.8 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 31 (1988)). The Edmonds Court 
also referred to Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 1158 before the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, IOOth 
Cong., 1st Sess., 656 (1987) which explicitly referred to the exemption as allowing landlords to 
refuse to "stuff large families into small quarters." !d. at 1782 n.9. 
37. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782. 
38. hi. 
39. ld. at 1783. 
40. !d. at 1782. 
41. !d. (quoting ECDC § 21.30.010.) 
42. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782-83. 
43. ld. at 1781. 
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Finally, the Court summarily dismissed the petitioner's claim that 
"subjecting single-family zoning [to the nondiscrimination requirements 
of the FHA] will 'overturn Euclidian zoning.' "44 Rather than address this 
issue, the Court noted that its holding was of limited scope45 -merely 
determining whether single-family zoning is subject to the "FHA's anti-
discrimination provisions."46 Because the FHA requires "only 'reason-
able' accommodations to afford persons with handicaps 'equal opportu-
nity to use and enjoy' housing,"47 it would still be possible to protect the 
effectiveness and purpose of single-family zoning. 
C. The Dissenting Opinion. 
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia 
and Kennedy, pointed to two errors made by the majority: 1) failure "to 
give effect to the plain language of the statute"48; and 2) the improper 
focus "on 'maximum occupancy restrictions' and 'family composition 
rules' ... which are "simply irrelevant to [the] case."49 
Because the plain language of the statute gives a broad exemption to 
restrictions regarding a maximum number of occupants, the dissent found 
that the majority erred. Rather then "set forth a narrow exemption only 
for 'absolute' or 'unqualified' restrictions regarding the maximum num-
ber of occupants, "50 the exemption applies to "any ... restrictio[ n] re-
garding the maximum number of occupants."51 Because Congress em-
ployed the terms "any" and "regarding" in the exemption, the dissent ar-
gued the exemption "sweeps broadly to exempt any restrictions regarding 
such maximum number. "52 
Under the dissent's reasoning, any statute which imposes a restriction 
"regarding" the maximum number of occupants can "take advantage of 
the exemption."53 ECDC section 21.30.010 restricts the maximum num-
ber of unrelated occupants to five. This establishes "a rule that 'no house 
in [a single family] area of the city shall have more than five occupants 
unless it is a [traditional kind of] family.' "54 Justice Thomas therefore 
argued that "petitioner's zoning code impose[ d) a qualified 'restrictio[n] 
regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a 
44. !d. at 1783. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. 
47. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(l)(A) and (f)(3)(B)). 
48. !d. at 1783 (dissenting opinion). 
49. !d. at 1785. 
50. !d. at 1784. 
51. !d. at 1783 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l) (emphasis added in original)). 
52. Edmonds, I I 5 S. Ct. at 1784. 
53. !d. 
54. !d. at 1783. 
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dwelling."55 Since the statute exempts "any" such restriction, the exemp-
tion applies in the instant case. 56 
Justice Thomas noted that the majority failed to ask the right question 
due to its flawed premise that the exemption should be read narrowly. 
The failure leads to the invention of categories of zoning rules which im-
properly restrict the exemption in an analysis which is entirely irrelevant 
to the case. According to the dissent, the question was not "[w]hat is the 
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a house",57 but 
"whether [the ordinance] imposes 'any ... restrictions regarding the 
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.' "58 
The dissent took issue with the majority's premise that the exemption 
must be read " 'narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the 
[policy]' "59 on four grounds. First, Justice Thomas questioned the logic 
of requiring an exemption to any statute with a "policy" to be read nar-
rowly, since every statute has a "policy."60 Second, "by giving [the ex-
emption] an artificially narrow reading ... [the majority] ... 'prevent[ed] 
the effectuation of congressional intent.' "61 Third, Justice Thomas argued 
the majority's narrow reading of the exemption "clashe[d] with our deci-
sion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-470 (1991)" which 
broadly interpreted an exemption included in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) of 196762 even though the ADEA "'broadly 
prohibits' age discrimination in the workplace."63 Finally, the dissent 
contended that because "'zoning laws and their provisions ... are pecu-
liarly within the province of state and local legislative authorities,' "64 
Congress should not be allowed to impliedly preempt the States' historic 
powers.65 For these reasons, according to the dissent, the exemption must 
be read broadly. 
Justice Thomas further criticized the Court for creating categories of 
zoning rules and determining that the statutory exemption encompasses 
only one category-"maximum occupancy restrictions." The dissent 
noted that the statutory exemption "bear[ s] a familial resemblance" to 
"maximum occupancy restrictions" as defined by the Court and "surely 
55. !d. at 1785. 
56. !d. 
57. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782. 
58. !d. at 1788 (dissenting opinion). 
59. /d. at 1780 (quoting Clark, 489 U.S. at 726). 
60. !d. at 1785 (dissenting opinion). 
61. !d. (quoting Board ofGovemors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361,374 
(1986)). 
62. 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). 
63. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1786 (dissenting opinion). 
64. !d. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.IS (1975)). 
65. !d. 
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encompasses" that category.66 However, the "obvious conclusion ... tells 
us nothing about whether the statute also encompasses ECDC section 
21.30.010."67 Therefore, while the majority's opinion "provides guidance 
for future cases, it is completely irrelevant to the question presented in 
[Edmonds]. "68 
The dissent also criticized the majority for inventing a category of 
zoning restrictions termed as "family composition rules"-then declaring 
that section 3607(b )(1) does not encompass it. Justice Thomas noted that 
the Court based its judgment on "family composition rules" while only 
"briefly alud[ing] to [its] derivation," concluded ECDC section 21.30.010 
was a "classic exampl[e],"69 and announced its conclusion that such rules 
do not fit within the statutory exemption, 70 and that the majority's conclu-
sion "is not reasoning; it is ipse dixit.'m Finally, the dissent noted that 
one using the reasoning of the majority would infer "3607(b )( 1) does not 
encompass zoning rules that have one particular purpose ... or ... refer 
to the qualitative as well as quantitative character of a dwelling,"72 even 
though such distinctions are "noticeably absent from the text of the stat-
ute."73 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court's reasoning can be broken into various parts. First, both 
the majority and the dissent agreed on the issue in the case-whether the 
statutory exemption includes ordinances which do not impose a maxi-
mum occupancy requirement on related as well as unrelated individuals.74 
While the dissent argued that the statute should be applied as written un-
der the plain meaning rule, thereby exempting Edmonds' ordinance, 75 the 
majority immediately began to interpret the statute. 76 The majority started 
by limiting the application of the exemption under the established princi-
ple of reading narrowly exemptions to a statute which has a broad pol-
66. !d. at 1787. 
67. /d. 
68. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1787. 
69. /d. (quoting ante, at 1782). 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
72. !d. at 1788. 
73. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1788. 
74. /d. at 1780; !d. at 1788 (dissenting opinion). 
75. !d. at 1783. 
76. !d. at 1780. 
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icy. 77 The majority then used the legislative history78 and writings by ex-
perts in zoning law to buttress its interpretation. 79 
A. Whether Statutes Which Do Not Impose Maximum Occupancy 
Limits on All Inhabitants Are Exempt from the FHA 
Clearly, the only issue before the Court was the applicability of the 
statutory exemption to ordinances which impose a restriction on the max-
imum number of occupants but not all occupants. The appellant at-
tempted to frame the issue as "'overturn[ing] Euclidian zoning' and '-
destroy[ing] the effectiveness and purpose of single-family zoning.' "80 
However, the dispute between the lower courts was on the breadth of the 
exemption, not the consequence of either action. Only the "threshold 
question" of whether the ordinance is exempt from the FHA lay before 
the Court.81 Properly, the Court considered only the factors relevant to the 
Issue. 
B. Plain Meaning Rule Prohibits Interpretation of a Statute Which Is 
Not Ambiguous 
The failure of the majority "to give effect to the plain language of the 
statute" drove the entire dissent opinion.82 While the majority devoted a 
substantial part of the opinion to interpreting the statute, 83 the dissent 
quickly applied the statute as written and determined Edmonds' ordi-
nance was exempt. The plain meaning rule requires that absent some am-
biguity in a statute, interpretation of the statute through use of legislative 
history or other materials is improper. 
The majority failed to declare outright that the statutory exemption 
contained ambiguities. While one could argue that ambiguity must be 
present since the circuit courts issued opposite rulings, to do so would 
77. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780. 
78. !d. at 1781-82. 
79. !d. at 1780-81. 
80. !d. at 1783 (quoting Brief for Petitioner II, 25). 
81. !d. This reasoning, however, may have carried some weight with the dissent. Justice 
Thomas noted that because the majority stipulates the statute is ambiguous, allowing the statute 
to "'pre-empt the historic powers of the States'" is entirely improper. To do so allows Congress 
to ambiguously intervene in traditional state and local powers of zoning contravenes the Court's 
holding in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring that Congress make its 
intention "clear and manifest" when intervening in historic powers of the States). Edmonds, 115 
S. Ct. at 1786 (dissenting opinion). Applying Gregory, the statute must be read broadly in order 
to prevent an ambiguous intervention in historic state and local powers which would invalidate 
thousands of local zoning ordinances. /d. 
82. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783. 
83. Of the approximate five page majority opinion, one and one-half pages were devoted 
to the facts and case history, two pages were used in interpreting the statute, with the remainder 
dedicated to the application of the facts to the interpreted statute. 
141] GROUP HOMES 151 
imply ambiguity in all cases where there is judicial disagreement.84 Such 
an implication of ambiguity would render the plain meaning rule ineffec-
tive. 
Rather than first determine whether the statutory exemption was am-
biguous, the Court immediately began to use the legislative history and 
writings by experts concerning zoning restrictions to create classifica-
tions of restrictions used in the interpretation of the statute. This interpre-
tation was advanced despite any reference to such classifications of re-
strictions in the statute. 85 The majority then applied its interpreted version 
of the statute to Edmonds' ordinance and held it to be not exempt. 
The legislative history can be read to reflect an intent by Congress to 
eliminate discrimination against group homes for the handicapped 
through local zoning ordinances. In the House report submitted with the 
legislation, the Judiciary Committee recognized the existence of "health, 
safety or land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements 
among non-related persons with disabilities ... not imposed on families 
and groups of similar size of other unrelated people ... which have the 
effect of discriminating against persons with disabilities."86 This report 
asserts that Congress amended the FHA "to prohibit special restrictive 
covenants or other terms or conditions, or denials of service because of 
an individual's handicap and which have the effect of excluding, for ex-
ample, congregate living arrangements for persons with handicaps. "87 
Furthermore, the provisions of the FHA were intended to "apply to state 
or local land use and health and safety laws, regulations, practices or 
84. While ambiguity surely leads to conflicting opinions, to assert that any situation with 
conflicting opinions in the application of a statute necessitates that the statute is ambiguous is 
clearly a non sequitur. The Court has expressly held that split of authority in the Circuits does 
not establish the ambiguity of a statute. Reno v. Korray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (1995); Beecham 
v. U.S., 114 S. Ct. 1669 (1994) (declaring a statute to be plain and unambiguous despite a 
disagreement between two circuits); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1981) (resolving that despite 
a conflict in the circuits a statute was unambiguous). The plain meaning rule measures ambiguity 
not by a "division of judicial authority," but by statutory ambiguity inherent in the statute. Moskal 
v. U.S., 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). 
85. See Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at J787. 
86. H.R. REP. No.l00-711, (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173 (emphasis added). 
87. !d. It would also be plausible to read this history in a way entirely opposite to the 
majority's reading. Rather than prohibit discrimination against any group home for the 
handicapped regardless of the number of occupants, the report seems to merely prohibit 
discrimination which results in the exclusion of group homes for the handicapped while allowing 
similar sized group homes for the non-handicapped. In other words, if a zoning ordinance has the 
effect of allowing in a group home with 10 non-handicapped occupants but excludes a group 
home of five occupants it would be considered discriminatory and unlawful under the FHA. 
However, if a zoning ordinance excluded any group home with 10 occupants, it would appear to 
be proper since it is not discriminating against "groups of similar size[s] of other unrelated 
people." !d. 
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decisions."88 Clearly Edmonds' ordinance was within the general scope 
of the FHA. 
While Edmonds' ordinance is obviously subject to the FHA, the leg-
islative history is less clear as to the purpose of the exemption. The Com-
mittee's report mentions that the FHA's provisions "are not intended to 
limit the applicability of any reasonable local, state, or federal restrictions 
on the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling 
unit."89 In passing, the report illustrates typical ordinances noting that the 
maximum is "based on a minimum number of square feet in the unit or 
the sleeping areas of the unit."90 The only clarification the report offers 
regarding the exemption is that "[r]easonable limitations by governments 
would be allowed to continue, as long as they were applied to all occu-
pants."91 Still, the exemption's purpose remains unclear. Despite a clear 
absence of the purpose of the exemption, the majority managed to deci-
pher a Congressional intent that "rules that cap the total number of occu-
pants in order to prevent overcrowding" are exempt while rules that aim 
to "preserve the family character of a neighborhood" are not exempt.92 
Thus, the majority found Congress intended to provide fair housing by 
eliminating discrimination against the handicapped while excluding rules 
with a purpose to prevent overcrowding. 
The majority has shown its preference for implementing the legisla-
tive intent even when it conflicts with the effect that the plain meaning 
rule would give. While the Court does not disclose the reason it ignored 
88. /d., see Soper, supra note 7, at 1046. 
89. H.R. REP. No.I00-711, (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173 (emphasis added). 
90. !d. 
91. !d., see also Jordan Herman, Note, Yes in Your Backyard! Occupancy Restrictions. Use 
Controls, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 22 SPG HuM. RTS. 14, 16 (1995). 
92. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782. Curiously, this appears at odds with Congress' intent to 
mainstream the handicapped into traditional family neighborhoods. See H.R. REP. No.I 00-711, 
supra note 86 at 18, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179 which states: 
[The FHAA] is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary 
exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use 
of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered 
as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded speculations 
about threats to safety are specifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion. 
See also Herman, supra note 91, at 16; Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental 
Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 925, 945 (1994); Richard B. Simring, The Impact of Federal Anti-
discrimination Laws on Housing for People with Mental Disabilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 413, 
420 (1991); Patrick F. Summers, Comment, Civil Rights: Persons infected with HJV: Steward B. 
McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission: Forcing the Aids Community to Live 
a Prophylactic Existence, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 538 (1993). Similarly, Oxford House has 
continuously argued that such environments are critically essential to the success of the program. 
Infra note 132. It would seem to follow that "preserv[ing] the family character of a neighborhood" 
is critical in the placement of group homes. See infra notes 130, 132. 
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the plain meaning rule, it appears to be because the logical result of a lit-
eral reading of the would actually nullify the legislative purpose of the 
statute-the prohibiting of discriminatory housing practices against per-
sons with handicaps.93 Because a city "can insulate its single-family zone 
entirely from FHA coverage" by including a specific number requirement 
for unrelated individuals, the FHA's policy would be circumvented.94 
Therefore, the Court reasoned that Congress would probably not create 
an exemption which abrogates the very purpose for which the statute was 
created. Unfortunately, the majority did not discuss their failure to follow 
the plain meaning rule, nor the circumstances when it would be proper to 
ignore the actual statutory construction in favor of a perceived statutory 
intent. 
C. A Narrow Reading of the Exemption 
The FHA's "broad and inclusive" policy prohibiting discrimina-
tion in housing against persons with handicaps95 requires a narrow read-
ing of any exceptions.96 On this reasoning, the majority pinned its deci-
sion to construe the exception in such a manner to reasonably restrict its 
use. Furthermore, the lack of substantial discussion in the opinion on 
such a reading97 enforces the majority's view that it is well settled doc-
trine. 
On its face, it appears reasonable to construe exceptions narrowly 
where a statute has a broad policy. Where Congress implements a statute 
in order to effectuate an objective which must be pervasive throughout 
society in order to have a meaningful effect, it would be proper to treat 
any exemptions from the policy tightly. Clearly, anti-discrimination laws 
must be enforced broadly in order to effect a general change in discrimi-
nation by society.98 In fact, because the FHA as originally enacted in 
1968 failed to prohibit discrimination to the extent intended by Congress, 
Congress amended the FHA at the time this exemption was created. For 
93. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1778. 
94. !d. at 1783 n.ll. 
95. /d. at 1778. See also, Soper, supra note 7, at 1038-39; Herman, supra note 91, at 15. 
96. Edmonds at 1779. See, e.g., United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 
882-83 (3d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2797 (1991); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 
F.3d 1491, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1995). 
97. One paragraph was dedicated to this proposition. 
98. The Supreme Court has long held that "remedial legislation should be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). A broad interpretation 
is appropriate in order to rectify "deep-seated social ills." Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title 
VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REv. I, 
72 (1995); see also Stuard W. Tisdale, Jr., Comment, Reasonable Accommodation and Non-
Invidious Discrimination Under the Maine Human Rights Act, 40 ME. L. REv. 475, 496 (1988). 
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these reasons, it would appear logical to construe the exemption narrowly. 
However, where an exemption on iis face clearly is written in a man-
ner which allows great latitude in its applicability, it would seem that 
such a doctrine would be inapplicable.99 The statute employs two words 
which demonstrate a broad reading: "any" and "regarding." 
The exemption exempts "any" restriction, which clearly creates a 
broad exemption. In the English language, "any" means "one indiffer-
ently out of more than two," "one or some indiscriminately of whatever 
kind," "one or more; all," and "one or some however imperfect."100 The 
dissent noted that "[a] broad construction of the word 'any' is hardly 
novel." 101 Rather, a recent Supreme Court decision noted "'Congress 
spoke without qualification' in ERISA [for] an exemption for 'any secu-
rity.' " 102 In 1904, the Supreme Court declared that when "any" is used in 
an exemption, "[i]t declares the exemption without limitation." 103 Simi-
larly, when the Ninth Circuit interpreted statutory language in the FHA 
employing the word "any," it found Congress intended a broad defini-
tion. 104 Clearly, employment of such a word in an exemption when refer-
ring to a restriction would engender a broad meaning. 
However, the statute does not allow just "any" restriction, but only 
those "regarding the maximum number of occupants" in a dwelling. 105 
Regarding means "with respect to" or "concerning."106 Therefore, the 
statute could be rewritten as exempting any restriction concerning the 
maximum number of occupants. Again, this does not appear to create the 
narrow exception applied by the majority. Rather, it appears that Con-
gress intended a broad construction. Logically, if a restriction imposes a 
maximum on the number of unrelated occupants in a building, it would 
"regard" or "concern" the maximum number of occupants. Merely be-
99. While the dissent argues that the doctrine requiring an exemption to a statute with a 
broad policy is illogical, it does so by arguing every statute has a policy and that therefore every 
exemption to a statute should be read narrowly. Clearly this would be absurd. However, the 
dissent does not recognize that not every statute has a broad policy such as opposition to 
discrimination and that therefore it would be sensible to read an exemption narrowly. Shortly after 
the dissent's dismissal of the majority's logic, it properly notes that it would be improper to 
"artificially narrow" the reading of an exemption where Congress legislated a broad exemption. 
Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1785 (dissenting opinion). 
I 00. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (16th ed. 1971 ). 
101. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1784 n.l (dissenting opinion). 
102. !d. 
103. !d. 
104. United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that "any 
dwelling" broadly defines a "dwelling" under the FHA) (emphasis added); see also NLRB v. 
Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1784 ( 1994) (holding "any 
individual" connotes a broad definition) (emphasis added). Ironically, this same court ignored its 
broad definition of "any" when construing the exemption narrowly. 
105. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(l) (emphasis added). 
106. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW iNTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 100. 
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cause it does not impose a requirement on the total number of occupants 
in a building does not make it fall within the FHA's authority. One would 
think that if Congress intended only total maximum occupancy limits to 
be exempt, they would have had the reasoning and intelligence to have 
included the word "total." Instead, it appears by using the majority's 
logic that Congress did not understand the import of the words "any" and 
"regarding", yet had the clear understanding of "land use restrictions" 
and "maximum occupancy restrictions." 107 On this basis, it would appear 
clear that the plain meaning of the statute requires a broad exemption to 
any restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants. 108 
D. Categorization of Zoning Laws 
In the majority's attempt to interpret the statutory exemption, the ma-
jority fashioned two categories of restrictions: "maximum occupancy 
restrictions" and "land use restrictions. " 109 The defining characteristic of 
each category of restriction lies in its purpose. 110 Next, the Court ex-
cluded "land use restrictions," and its complement of "family composi-
tion rules," from the statutory exemption. 111 Because the statute does not 
include "family composition rules" which Edmonds' ordinance resem-
bled, the majority came to the conclusion that the FHA does not exempt 
Edmonds' ordinance. 112 
107. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1780. While the majority stipulates that Congress "enacted [the 
exemption] against the backdrop of an evident distinction between [the two categories]", id., the 
dissent noted that the tem1 "maximum occupancy limit" is conspicuously absent from both federal 
and state judicial decisions-disregarding three decisions relating to this exemption-and all 
"model codes from which the majority construct[ ed] its category of zoning rules." !d. at 1786, n.5 
(dissenting opinion). Rather than use a definition created and used by Congress in the statute, the 
CoUtt appears to have instructed Congress what it meant. See id. at 1780-81. But see id. at 1781, 
n.7 (disputing the dissents suggestion by referencing "terminology in the APHA-CDC Standards"). 
108. But see, Miller, supra note 2, at 1499. 
109. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781. See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, Ya., 
825 F. Supp. 1251, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1993) (recognizing that the FHA's coverage "does not 
encompass all land use regulations" including those "regarding the maximum number of occupants 
permitted to occupy a dwelling;" impliedly requiring that the majority's "maximum occupancy 
requirements" be considered a land use regulation). See also Taylor Investment, Ltd. v. Upper 
Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting maximum occupancy requirements 
are merely an aspect of "land-use regulation"); Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 
945 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting "general land use regulations" impose maximum 
occupancy requirements). 
110. It appears that the majority may have confused "categories of zoning restrictions" for 
different purposes for zoning. See NORMAN WILLIAMS JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 51.01 
(1987) noting "policy reasons raised by local governing bodies that seek to exclude multifamily 
dwellings through the implementation of land use regulations generally can be separated into two 
groups ... [d]ensity-related factors and [f]actors not related to density." But see, Herman, supra 
note 91, at 16 (suggesting a difference between occupancy restrictions and use controls with the 
exception referring only to the former). 
111. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1781-82. 
112. !d. at 1783. The dissent argues that such logic "is not reasoning; it is ipse dixit." /d. 
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The majority defined "maximum occupancy restrictions" as restric-
tions which "purpose is to protect health and safety by preventing dwell-
ing overcrowding." 113 Such restrictions have some common characteris-
tics-they: 1) "cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in 
relation to available floor space or number and type of rooms" 114; and 2) 
"ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling units." 115 
Having defined and classified "maximum occupancy restrictions," 
the majority then held that the statutory exemption includes only such 
restrictions. 116 Such a holding necessarily would follow because clearly 
such classified restrictions regard the maximum number of occupants in a 
house. However, whether the created classification is included is not at 
issue in the case. The issue remains whether Edmonds' ordinance regards 
a maximum number of occupants. 117 
In analyzing Edmonds' ordinance with "maximum occupancy re-
strictions," the majority found it incompatible. The reasoning is not so 
much because the ordinance contains a requirement regarding the maxi-
mum number of occupants, but because its primary purpose is to define 
"[f]amily living, not living space per occupant." 118 Therefore, it would 
appear that if the primary purpose of an ordinance is not to define "living 
space per occupant," it is not a "maximum occupancy restriction" and 
remains subject to the FHA. The purpose of the ordinance appears to be 
the overriding factor. Since the majority noted "maximum occupancy 
restrictions" "typically [apply caps] in relation to floor space or number 
and type of rooms" which "ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of 
dwelling units," 119 it would follow that a "nontypical" or "unordinary" 
restriction may not apply caps in such a fashion. Yet, the Court failed to 
explain why "nontypical" or "unordinary" restrictions would not be con-
sidered as "any" restriction "regarding" maximum occupancy limits. 
at 1787 (dissenting opinion). 
113. !d. at 1781. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1495-99. 
114. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct at 1781 (referring to UNIFORM HOUSING CODE § 503(b ); BOCA 
NATIONAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE §§ PM-405.3, PM-405.5 (1993); STANDARD HOUSING 
Com. §§ 306.1, 306.2 (1991 ); API-lA-CDC RECOMMENDED MINIMUM I-lOUSING STANDARDS § 9.02 
at 37 (1986)). 
115. !d. (referring to BOCA NATIONAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE §§ PM-101.3, PM-
405.3, PM-405.5 and commentary; Samuel B. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant 
Remedies, 56 B.U. L. Rev. I, 41-45 (1976)). See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 
Va, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1993) (defining maximum occupancy limit as only 
applying to all occupants--related or not). 
116. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1783. 
117. The dissent "readily concedes" that zoning rules labeled by the majority as "maximum 
occupancy restrictions" are encompassed by the statutory language. That the statutory language 
encompasses such restrictions "is completely irrelevant to the question presented in this case," 
merely "provid[ing] guidance in future cases." Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1787 (dissenting opinion). 
118. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct at 1783. 
119. /d.atl781. 
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The majority defined "land use restrictions" as ordinances which 
"aim to prevent problems caused by the 'pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard.' " 120 Ironically, after the majority dedicated its effort to defining 
"land use restrictions," it did not discuss whether such restrictions are 
encompassed by the statute. Rather, the majority devised another classifi-
cation of zoning rules "tied to land use restrictions"-namely "family 
composition rules." 121 Then in one sentence, the majority defined the cat-
egory as "rules designed to preserve the family character of a neighbor-
hood" and summarily concluded such rules are not exempt "from the 
FHA's governance."122 It would appear that as an afterthought, the major-
ity constructed "family composition rules" to lend support to the its de-
sire for a proper outcome conforming with the broad policy of the FHA, 
so as not to remain constricted to the plain language written into the ex-
emption. 123 
The Court looked to the purpose of Edmonds' ordinance and con-
cluded that it is a "family composition rule" and therefore not exempt 
from the FHA. Because Edmonds' ordinance provides that occupancy is 
limited to a family of any number of related individuals accompanied by 
a limit on the number of unrelated individuals to five, the majority saw 
the ordinance as a failed attempt to "conver[t] a family values preserver 
into a maximum occupancy restriction." 124 When an ordinance has mixed 
purposes, the Court seems to presume the primary purpose (or categori-
zation) to be that which would not qualify the ordinance for an exemption 
from the FHA. 
V. THE MARRIAGE OF GROUP HOMES WITH SINGLE-FAMILY ZONES 
While the Court properly refused to consider the consequences of its 
interpretation of the FHA, the Court's apparent misinterpretation of the 
plain meaning of the statute will subject single-family zoning laws to 
FHA scrutiny and result in the abolishment of any sanctuary such zones 
now enjoy from group homes. Courts which followed the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in denying the applicability of the exemption to similar 
ordinances have found that limits on unrelated occupants have a discrimi-
natory impact on the handicapped. 125 As a result, courts have required 
120. /d. (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388). 
121. !d. at 1782. 
122. !d. 
123. The dissent notes that the majority's "decision hinge[s] on the majority's judgment that 
ECDC § 21.30.010 is a 'classic exampl[e] of a ... family composition rule.'" Yet, the "majority 
says virtually nothing about this crucial category." Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1787 (dissenting 
opinion) (quoting majority at 1782). 
124. !d. at 1783. 
125. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1176 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) 
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that reasonable accommodations be made for group homes. Courts gener-
ally interpret reasonable accommodation as requiring zoning variances to 
allow group homes to coexist with single-family dwellings. 
As a result of the Court's holding, communities desiring to exclude 
group homes have few options available. 126 First, communities can ac-
commodate group homes in single-family zones by creating exceptions to 
their exclusionary ordinances. Second, the single-family ordinances 
could be modified to conform with the Court's interpretation of the ex-
emption. Third, restrictive ordinances which attempt to maintain a "nor-
mal" residential environment for the handicapped through dispersal re-
quirements or to protect the handicap through licensing may be em-
ployed. Finally, communities could seek a change in the statute by lobby-
ing Congress for a change in either the exemption to clearly exempt any 
ordinance whose purpose is to preserve the traditional single-family zone 
or in the definition of handicapped to mitigate group homes seen as in-
compatible with residential neighborhoods. 
By modifying single-family ordinances to include exemptions for 
group homes, or accommodating group homes on a case-by-case basis, 
communities could maintain a limited single-family zone. 127 While ex-
empting group homes from restrictions on the number of unrelated occu-
pants would allow communities to escape litigation in the court room, it 
would most probably be very unpopular with residents in such zones. 128 
(limiting the number of unrelated people to three); Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. 
Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding three-person limit has disparate impact on the handicapped 
even with group home exception allowing up to eight individuals). 
126. An alternative option which does not violate the law but is not discussed here due to 
its inherent limitation is the neighbors' purchase of the home sought by the group. See Michigan 
Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, No. 92-2073, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3533, 1994 
FED App. 75 March 2, 1994. See also Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
127. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1510 (detailing components of a model regulating act for 
group homes by the ABA Land Use Regulation Committee). 
128. Generally, neighbors to group homes express fears regarding an increase in crime from 
the occupants of group homes for alcoholics and former drug users. See Oxford House-C, 843 F. 
Supp at 1565 n.IO (E.D. Mo. 1994) (noting that "this is because many, if not most, recovering 
addicts or alcoholics have criminal records resulting from their behavior while using alcohol and 
drugs"). However, it appears that the animosity the public shares towards group homes in single 
family zones may be ill-founded. Over "50 studies show that community residences generate no 
adverse impacts on single-family districts if they are licensed and not clustered on a block." 
Daniel Lauber, Group Think: a recent Supreme Court ruling should make local governments 
reconsider their community residence regulations: includes definition and resource information, 
PLANNING, Oct. 1995 at 17. These resulls may be due to the fact that group homes for recovering 
alcoholics and drug addicts often require that the occupants "refrain completely from alcohol and 
drugs, both in and out of the house." Brief for Respondents Oxford House, Inc. 819 F. Supp 1160 
(N.D.N.Y. 1993). Furthermore, a single lapse brings immediate expulsion." !d. The U.S. News and 
World Report noted that while many residents initially oppose group homes, after a short period 
of time the neighbors "appreciate" the homes. An ever escalating evidence standard; Group homes 
find a friend in court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT May 29, 1995 at II. (noting neighbors of 
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Unless public opinion changes to accept group homes, this is not a very 
viable option. 
If communities modified single-family ordinances to conform with 
the Court's interpretation of the exemption, group homes may possibly 
be excluded. Any such modification would require that either the purpose 
would be to safeguard the health and safety of homes within the zone, or 
impose an absolute maximum on all occupants of dwellings. 129 Limits 
based on the size of the house, such as occupants per square foot or per 
room, would only limit densely compacted group homes. Hence, in a 
large house, a group home with ten to twelve occupants might still be 
allowed. The only way to effectively exclude group homes housing a 
large number of occupants appears to be by limiting the total occupancy 
of all homes in the zone. However, such restrictions may be viewed as 
unreasonable to the very residents communities are trying to protect, by 
not allowing uses of residential property for large traditional families. 
Ordinances restricting group homes in order to maintain a "normal" 
environment for the handicapped or requiring licensing of such homes to 
protect the occupants have had mixed success. Dispersal restrictions 
which require a minimum distance between group homes to maintain a 
"normal" environment have been held valid due to the "government's 
interest in de-institutionalization." 130 The crucial factor appears to be an 
group homes m Boston and Long Island originally fought the opening of the homes but three 
years later "appreciated'' or dropped their objections to the homes). As recently as 1994, a court 
had noted "all scientific studies involving group homes of nine or more demonstrate that such 
congregate living arrangements have no discernible effect on property values, safety, crime rates, 
or any other measurable value." Oxford House-C, 843 F.Supp. at 1580. As the studies have 
concluded, it appears that residents' fears materialize only when a neighborhood becomes heavily 
saturated. Group homes clustered in county, TRiBUNE REv., Feb. 5, 1995 at A I (noting "some 
authors warn that a concentration of too many facilities could decrease property values, increase 
crime and destroy the overall quality of life"). It would appear that a community's zoning laws 
should be aimed not at preventing the introduction of group homes into single family zones but 
at regulating the density of such homes in the community. See also, Soper, supra note 7, at 1037; 
Herman, supra note 91, at 14; Miller, supra note 2, at 1500-07. But see Village of Belle Terre, 
416 U.S. at 9 (noting homes with numerous adults have the potential to increase noise and 
traffic). 
129. Such a maximum could also be found unconstitutional under Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland 431 U.S. 494 (1977) which held that "slic[e] deeply into the family itself" by 
regulating related individuals violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment). See 
Graham, supra note 7, at 702. 
130. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(finding requirement of one quarter mile between "residential treatment facilities" valid under the 
FHA). See also, United States v. City of Taylor, Mich., 872 F. Supp. 423, 442 (E. D. Mich. 1995) 
(requiring amendment of City's zoning code which seeks to restrict group homes due to 
"unsupported, speculative, and irrational fears" of being "flooded" by group homes); Soper, supra 
note 7, at 1041-42, 1044-45. But see Larkin v. State of Michigan, 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 
1994) (holding requirement of 1,500 feet between "residential facilit[icsj" to violate the FHA due 
to disparate impact.); Horizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v. Township of Upper 
Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (stipulating a "1,000 foot rule [between group 
homes] unlawful under the [FHA], because it creates an explicit classification based on handicap" 
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intent not to discriminate but to maintain the family environment so es-
sential to the rehabilitation goals of a group home. 131 This would also 
help alleviate concerns of neighbors who fear an increase in crime or de-
crease in property values will accompany a group home. As noted earlier, 
such fears only materialize when there is a gettoization of group 
homes, 132 which dispersal requirements would prevent. Similarly, it 
would appear to follow that limitations on the number of vehicles, adults, 
or other attributes which validly concern the community for the health 
and safety of such areas would be possible. 133 Finally, courts have al-
lowed licensing requirements for group homes as long as restrictions are 
narrowly tailored to the needs of the handicapped. 134 How-ever, any of 
these approaches carry two risks. First, as mentioned previously, large 
families may find themselves inconvenienced. This would lead to politi-
cal pressure on communities. Second, any modified statute would be 
heavily litigated. The expense of the litigation would be difficult to jus-
tify when balanced against the uncertainty of the outcome. 
If communities view group homes as truly incompatible with single-
family zones, the most effective method to exclude group homes would 
with only rational basis integration which is "not adequate justification under the FHAA"). 
131. The respondent's brief notes that "it is essential to the residents' sustained recovery that 
they live in an environment far removed from opportunities for drug and alcohol abuse." Brief 
for Respondents Oxford House, Inc., Oxford House-Edmonds, and Herb Hamilton at 10, Edmonds 
117 S. Ct 1776 (1995). Logically, it would follow that group homes would eschew neighborhoods 
with a high concentration of group homes since the essential character so conducive to a group 
homes success would be heavily diluted. See also, Herbert A. Eastman, Oxford Houses v. 
NIMBY--Zoning Conflicts Between Cities and Group Homes for Recovering Alcoholics and Drug 
Addicts, PROBATE & PROPERTY, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 56; Miller, supra note 2, at 1475-76, 1501-02. 
132. See supra note 129. 
133. Courts have noted that restrictions seeking to preserve the residential character of a 
community may be enforceable. Such restrictions include population density requirements "by 
reference to floor space and facilities," enforcement of "noise and morality" through "police power 
ordinances and criminal statutes," and "[t]raffic and parking ... by limitations on the number of 
cars . . and by off-street parking requirements." City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 
436 (Cal. 1980). See Graham, supra note 7, at 703. 
134. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504 (finding "restrictions that are narrowly tailored to the 
particular individuals affected could be acceptable under the FHAA if the benefit to the 
handicapped in their housing opportunities clearly outweigh whatever burden may result to them); 
Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. I 992) (holding the FHA does 
not prohibit a city from "imposing any special safety standards for the protection of 
developmentally disabled persons ... so long as that protection is demonstrated to be wan·anted 
by the unique and specific needs and abilities of those handicapped persons"); Thornton v. City 
of Allegan, 863 F.Supp. 504, 508-10 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (upholding denial of special use permit 
where reasonable accommodation was made for an alternative site). See also, Miller, supra note 
2, at I 508 (noting most courts allow some form of regulation of group homes so long as other 
group of unrelated individuals are also regulated). But see, Soper, supra note 7, at 1041 (noting 
judicial willingness to find violations of FHAA on basis of discriminatory effect alone and 
accommodation reasonable and mandatory where the accommodation sought "does not require a 
municipality to alter its zoning scheme or incur any administrative burdens"); Miller, supra note 
2, at 1491-92 (noting a case which held code restrictions on group homes must have a legitimate 
safety interest). 
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be a statutory change in either the FHA exemption to clearly protect 
zones or in the definition of handicapped. On August 9, 1995, Senator 
Faircloth introduced a bill to amend the Fair Housing Act, co-sponsored 
by Senators Frist, Bennett and Shelby. The bill sponsor asserts it "would 
overturn the ... City of Edmonds versus Oxford House" by "clarify[ing] 
that localities can continue to zone certain areas as single family neigh-
borhoods, by limiting the number of unrelated occupants living to-
gether."135 The bill would accomplish this result by amending the exemp-
tion to permit "any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regard-
ing the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling, 
including any restriction relating to the maximum number of unrelated 
persons permitted to occupy a dwelling, if the purpose of the restriction is 
to restrict land use to single family dwellings."136 This bill appears ade-
quate since it clearly stipulates that zoning law regulations which seek to 
preserve the traditional character of single-family zones are exempt. It 
could be further clarified, however, by including language which defines 
a set number of unrelated individuals as per se reasonable. 137 This would 
clearly exempt any local zoning ordinance similar to the one analyzed by 
the Edmonds Court. An alternative to this statutory change 138 would be 
one which stipulates that recovering alcoholics and drug users are not 
handicapped. By excluding classes whose handicap is directly correlated 
with criminal behavior139 from protection under the FHA, this change in 
135. 141 CONG. REc. S 12079-03 (statement of Senator Faircloth). While Senator Faircloth 
stated "[t)he Congress clearly intended an exemption ... regarding the number of unrelated 
occupants living together" and "the Supreme Court ruled incorrectly in [the] case," the Senator 
was only recently elected (1992) and did not actually participate in the debate over the FHA 
Amendment of 1988. !d. 
136. S. 1132, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This bill has been referred to the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 
137. E.g., instead of exempting reasonable restrictions on the number of unrelated 
individuals, a stipulation that any restriction on unrelated individuals greater than five is presumed 
reasonable. 
138. Per discussion with Senator Fairchild's office, Jim Hyland, Legislative Director, has 
estimated the proposed bill has a 50% chance of final passage. Mr. Hyland noted that within the 
Senate, there is "a growing concern that FHA is being stretched beyond its intent." This concern 
arises over two issues: 1) the treatment of recovering alcoholics and drug users as handicapped; 
and 2) the artificial narrowing of a broad exemption which effectively prohibits local zoning 
ordinances from regulating the number of occupants in group homes for the handicapped. See 
supra note 7 (noting one court's holding that the plain meaning of physical handicap does not 
include recovering alcoholics and drug users), and supra note 133 (analyzing the legislative 
history in a way which would clearly allow for local zoning ordinances to limit the number of 
occupants in group homes, albeit in a nondiscriminatory fashion). See also Miller, supra note 2, 
at 1479 (stating that group home operators have used the FHA as a "tool to combat exclusionary 
zoning of group homes). 
139. It has been well established that a direct connection exists between drug use and 
criminal behavior. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and 
the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547 (1995) ("The connection between the drug 
use and crime is underscored by a substantial statistical overlap: there is a high level of drug use 
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definition would largely resolve neighbors' concerns regarding increased 
crime with a corresponding decline in property values. For communities 
which desire to preserve their historic character, one of these statutory 
changes may be feasible given the current political environment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By subjecting traditional single-family zoning to the scrutiny of the 
FHA, the successful exclusion of group homes will come to an end. By 
ignoring the plain meaning rule, the Court has shown a willingness to 
look beyond unambiguous statutes in order to apply the law according to 
its determination of the actual legislative intent. In the interpretation of 
exceptions to statutes harboring a broad policy, the Court will employ a 
narrow reading even when a broad reading appears to be more appropri-
ate. In order to protect the statutory policy, the Court has shown its will-
ingness to create classifications of zoning law to support perceived legis-
lative purposes. The holding in Edmonds give communities effectively 
two options: 1) accept group homes, with the possibility of regulating 
such homes though health and safety requirements and/or dispersal re-
strictions; or 2) seek a legislative change to the FHA. 
Paul Holmes Masters 
among people who commit crimes and people who use drugs also commit a large number of 
crimes."); Duane C. McBride & Clyde B. McCoy, The Drugs-Crime Relationsh1jJ: An Analytical 
Framework, 73 PRISON J. 257, 268 (I 994) (stating "a large volume of research clearly indicates 
that frequency of drug use has a strong impact on the extent, direction, and duration of that 
(criminal) career"); Lana Harrison & Joseph Gfroerer, The Intersection of Drug Use and Criminal 
Behavior: Results from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 422 
(1992); Nancy Lewis, Drug Use Up Among Young Suspects;Cocaine. Marijuana Make a 
Comeback as 26% of Arrested D. C. Juveniles Test Positive, THE WASHINGTON PosT, August 23, 
I 991, at Dl (finding that approximately twenty percent of juveniles arrested were using drugs). 
But see Jason Bennetto, Juvenile crime 'not linked to drug abuse': Delinquency: 'Risk-takers ' defy 
get-tough Government policy, THE INDEPENDENT, January 16, 1996, at 7 (noting a report stating 
there is little evidence of a direct link between drug use and crime). 
